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Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2007 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United States,1 regarding the federal
government’s jurisdiction over waters under the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”),2 and held that in order for federal jurisdiction to exist over a
water that is not navigable in fact, the water must have a “significant
nexus” with a water that is navigable in fact.3 Also under the CWA, the
court partially reversed a granting of summary judgment to the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, holding that the department
had improperly excluded some types of evidence in approving Florida’s
2002 list of impaired waters.4 In a case concerning the Endangered
Species Act,5 the Eleventh Circuit held that (1) the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service had reasonably concluded that the Alabama
sturgeon was a separate species and (2) listing the fish, a noncommercial
species found only in Alabama, did not violate the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.6 The court also held that the agency’s
failure to designate the critical habitat for the sturgeon, as required by
the Endangered Species Act, was not fatal to the listing procedure.7
The Eleventh Circuit also decided two cases concerning the Clean Air
Act.8 One case arose out of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s alleged
failure to comply with the Clean Air Act’s New Source programs
* Instructor, University of Georgia School of Law. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia School of
Law (J.D., 1993).
1. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
3. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).
4. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt (Sierra Club II), 488 F.3d 904, 913 (11th Cir. 2007).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
6. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1260, 1277 (11th
Cir. 2007); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
7. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1268.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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regarding a boiler that it modified in 1982-1983.9 The court there held
that two of the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred and a third failed due
to insufficient pre-suit notice.10 In the other case, the court held (1)
that the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of a Georgia
state regulation, promulgated as part of its state implementation plan
under the Clean Air Act, was entitled to deference and (2) that the
agency’s interpretation was reasonable.11
I. CLEAN WATER ACT
In United States v. Robison,12 the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the
United States Supreme Court’s plurality decision in Rapanos v. United
States13 that defined “navigable waters” under the CWA.14 The court
adopted the definition set out by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in
Rapanos and held that a district court’s jury charge that was based on
pre-Rapanos Eleventh Circuit precedent was erroneous.15
In Robison the United States brought criminal charges against a
Birmingham, Alabama manufacturer of cast iron products and several
of its managers, alleging unauthorized discharges of pollutants into
Avondale Creek, a perennial stream that flows through another
perennial stream, which then flows into a lake, which in turn flows
through a fork of the Black Warrior River, and finally into the Black
Warrior River itself.16 The evidence at trial clearly showed that the
defendants had discharged process wastewater from the plant into
Avondale Creek from discharge points other than the one authorized by
the plant’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (“NPD-
ES”) permit; process wastewater also regularly overflowed into the
plant’s stormwater discharge system, which flowed into Avondale
Creek.17
The CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into “navigable waters,”
except in accordance with a permit issued pursuant to the CWA.18
9. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 502 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2007).
10. Id.
11. Sierra Club v. Adm’r, U.S. E.P.A., 496 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2007).
12. 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).
13. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
15. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1223-24.
16. Id. at 1211-12. McWane, Inc. was the corporate defendant. Individual defendants
were Charles Robison, McWane’s Vice President for Environmental Affairs, James Delk,
the plant’s general manager, and Michael Devine, its manager. Id. at 1211.
17. Id. at 1212.
18. Id. at 1215 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), 1362(12) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
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Thus, for the federal government to have jurisdiction under the CWA,
there must be an unpermitted discharge into a navigable water.19 With
respect to the jurisdictional question, the district court charged the jury,
in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Eidson,20 that to qualify as a navigable water, “ ‘[t]he stream into which
the discharge is made may be a natural or manmade [stream] and may
flow continuously or only intermittently, as long as it may eventually
flow directly or indirectly into a navigable stream or river whose use
affects interstate commerce.’”21 In accordance with this definition, the
United States established that Avondale Creek eventually flowed into
the Black Warrior River, a navigable water, but presented no other
evidence to establish jurisdiction.22 Specifically, the court noted that
the United States presented “no evidence . . . of the chemical, physical,
or biological effect that Avondale Creek’s waters had or might have had
on the Black Warrior River” or of “any actual harm or injury to the
Black Warrior River” caused by the defendants’ violations.23
Following the defendants’ convictions, the United States Supreme
Court decided Rapanos, a wetlands case in which the court set out to
define “navigable waters” for CWA jurisdictional purposes.24 According
to the court in Robison, “[t]he entire Supreme Court agreed that the
term ‘navigable waters’ encompasses something more than traditionally
‘navigable-in-fact’ waters,” but while a five-member majority remanded
the consolidated cases for further consideration of whether the wetlands
at issue constituted navigable waters, the majority disagreed about the
appropriate definition to be applied.25 As noted by the court in
Robison, Justice Scalia, writing for a four-member plurality, stated that
navigable waters include only “ ‘relatively permanent, standing or
19. Id. at 1224.
20. 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997). The court in Robison recounted the definition of
“navigable waters” from Eidson as follows:
In Eidson, we observed: (1) that Congress chose to define broadly the waters
covered by the CWA; (2) that it was “well-established that Congress intended to
regulate the discharge of pollutants into all waters that may eventually lead to
waters affecting interstate commerce”; and (3) that courts repeatedly had
recognized that tributaries to waters affecting interstate commerce—even when
man-made or intermittently flowing—were subject to the CWA.
Robison, 505 F.3d at 1215-16 (quoting Eidson, 108 F.3d at 1341-42).
21. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1215 (brackets in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting jury
charge).
22. Id. at 1211-12.
23. Id. at 1212.
24. 547 U.S. 715.
25. 505 F.3d at 1216.
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continuously flowing bodies of water.’”26 Furthermore, because
wetlands only fall within the jurisdictional scope of navigable waters if
they are “adjacent to” such waters, the plurality held that “ ‘only those
wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ”waters
of the United States“ in their own right, so that there is no clear
demarcation between ”waters“ and wetlands, are ”adjacent to“ such
waters and covered by the Act.’”27 Thus, the court in Robison stated
that two findings are required to meet the plurality’s test for establish-
ing that wetlands are covered by the Act: (1) the channel adjacent to the
wetland must contain “‘“a water of the United States,”’ ” which is “ ‘a
relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate
navigable waters’” and (2) the wetland must have “ ‘a continuous surface
connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the
”water“ ends and the ”wetland“ begins.’”28
In his concurring opinion in Rapanos, Justice Kennedy stuck with the
Supreme Court’s earlier definition of navigable waters from the Court’s
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers:29 the “significant nexus” test.30 The court
in Robison noted that under this test, “a ‘water or wetland’ can only be
‘navigable’ under the CWA if it possesses a ‘“significant nexus” to waters
that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so
made.’”31 The court also noted that under Justice Kennedy’s test, in
order for a wetland to have a significant nexus to a navigable-in-fact
water, it must,
“either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the
region, . . . significantly affect[] the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘naviga-
ble.’ When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water quality are
speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encom-
passed by the statutory term ‘navigable waters.’ ”32
Justice Kennedy further noted in his concurrence that a “ ‘mere
hydrologic connection’” between a wetland and a navigable water “ ‘may
be too insubstantial’” to establish such a nexus.33 Finally, the court in
26. Id. at 1217 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 716 (plurality opinion)).
27. Id. (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion)).
28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality
opinion)).
29. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
30. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31. 505 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
32. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
33. Id. (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 784 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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Robison observed that the four Justices dissenting in Rapanos would
uphold jurisdiction when either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test
was met.34
In Robison the court held that the Eleventh Circuit would adopt
Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test as the prevailing definition of
navigable waters from Rapanos.35 The court noted that under Marks
v. United States,36 “when a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only
on the result of a case, lower courts ‘are to follow the narrowest ground
to which a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to
choose.’”37 The court explained that the “narrowest ground” is more
clearly stated as the “ ‘less far-reaching’ common ground.”38 The court,
unlike the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, also
disregarded the dissenting Justices’ opinion on the proper definition
because “Marks does not direct lower courts interpreting fractured
Supreme Court decisions to consider the positions of those who
dissented.”39 As such, the court held that the remaining issue to be
decided was which of the concurring opinions in Rapanos put forth the
least far-reaching position.40 Specifically, the issue hinged on which
definition of navigable waters, found within either the plurality opinion
authored by Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, was less
far-reaching, that is, less-restrictive of CWA jurisdiction.41 The court
concluded that in wetlands cases, waters would more often be classified
as navigable under Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test than under
Justice Scalia’s test, and thus Justice Kennedy’s test was less-restric-
tive.42 The court explained that Justice Scalia’s test contained two
limitations rejected by Justice Kennedy’s test: (1) that navigable waters
34. Id. at 1219 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
35. Id. at 1221. The court noted that the circuits are thus far split on the proper
application of Rapanos: the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence controls regarding the definition of navigable waters, while the First Circuit
has concluded that in a CWA case the United States could elect to establish jurisdiction
under either the plurality’s test or Justice Kennedy’s test. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1219
(citing and discussing N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.
2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam),
cert. denied 128 S. Ct. 45 (2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006), cert.
denied 128 S. Ct. 375 (2007)).
36. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
37. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1220 (quoting Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724).
38. Id. at 1221 (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234,
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“must be ‘relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water’” and
(2) that there must be a “ ‘continuous surface connection’” between the
bodies of water.43 The court acknowledged that if the circumstances
were different from Rapanos, Justice Scalia’s test may allow for broader
CWA jurisdiction, but it also recognized that it could not merely ignore
the facts underlying Rapanos when determining which of its various
opinions is narrowest.44
The court in Robison then determined that the district court’s charge
was erroneous and that the error was harmful because the United States
failed to present any evidence to establish a significant nexus between
Avondale Creek and the Black Warrior River.45 Specifically, the court
noted that the United States presented no evidence to show that
Avondale Creek had any chemical, physical, or biological effect on the
Black Warrior River, or that the Black Warrior River suffered any actual
harm.46 Based on this finding, as well as other issues, the court
remanded the case for a new trial in which the government would have
an opportunity to present evidence that a significant nexus existed
between Avondale Creek and the Black Warrior River, and the
defendants would have a similar opportunity to present contrary
evidence.47
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision to adopt Justice Kennedy’s significant
nexus test as the operative holding in Rapanos will limit the federal
government’s jurisdiction in Clean Water Act cases in this circuit. The
court noted that thus far, circuits have split on the proper application of
Rapanos.48 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits both adopted the significant nexus test as the proper
test.49 The First Circuit, on the other hand, has held that under
Rapanos, the government may elect to establish jurisdiction under either
the significant nexus test or the plurality’s continuous surface connection
test because the four dissenting Justices in Rapanos would uphold
jurisdiction under either test.50 The United States Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in both the Seventh Circuit and First Circuit cases,
43. Id. at 1221-22 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
44. Id. at 1222.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1223.
47. Id. at 1224.
48. Id. at 1219.
49. The Seventh Circuit adopted the significant nexus test in United States v. Gerke
Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), and the Ninth Circuit adopted
it in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007).
50. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 60.
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leaving the circuits to sort out Rapanos without further guidance.51
Also, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that under the facts of Robison,
the plurality’s continuous surface connection test would be more likely
to result in CWA jurisdiction than Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus
test, and it seems that this situation would generally arise in any case
involving flowing surface waters such as streams and rivers, as opposed
to wetlands.52 Under the plurality’s test, a continuous surface connec-
tion between the water at issue and a navigable-in-fact water, without
more, will establish jurisdiction, so presumably the government would
have jurisdiction over any perennial stream flowing to a navigable-in-
fact waterway. Under the significant nexus test, though, the govern-
ment would have to establish that the stream significantly affected the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the navigable-in-fact
waterway.
In Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt (Sierra Club II),53 the Eleventh Circuit
reversed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) on the plaintiffs’ CWA claims
that the EPA violated its oversight responsibility under the CWA by
acting arbitrarily in approving Florida’s list of impaired waters.54 The
Eleventh Circuit held that in evaluating water bodies for inclusion on its
impaired waters list, Florida (and the EPA) should have considered
stream data older than seven-and-a-half years and also water-body
specific fish consumption advisories for mercury.55 Because the EPA’s
evaluation lacked any consideration of these factors, the court observed
that factual issues remained regarding whether additional water bodies
should be added to the impaired waters list, and it concluded that
summary judgment for the EPA was improper concerning the issue of
whether the agency acted arbitrarily in approving Florida’s list.56 The
court also held that the EPA had a duty to review the procedure Florida
used to prioritize water bodies for establishing pollutant limits, and it
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Florida had
properly ranked the water bodies.57 On the other hand, the court held
that the EPA did not act arbitrarily in concluding that Florida did not
have to consider statewide fish consumption advisories when evaluating
51. Gerke Excavating, Inc. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 45 (2007); Johnson v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 375 (2007).
52. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1223.
53. 488 F.3d 904 (11th Cir. 2007).
54. Id. at 913.
55. Id. at 913, 916.
56. Id. at 917.
57. Id. at 917-18.
1168 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
any particular water body for inclusion on its impaired waters list.58
The court also held that the EPA could correct omissions in Florida’s list
by unilaterally adding waters to the list, rather than being required to
disregard the list in its entirety and develop its own independent list.59
The court concluded that Florida (and the EPA) could evaluate water
bodies for inclusion on the list using a totality of circumstances
approach, and thus, Florida could decide not to list water bodies
notwithstanding the existence of discrete test samples showing elevated
levels of pollutants in the waters.60 Finally, the court held that Florida
(and the EPA) was not required to include waters on the list that did not
meet water quality standards due to natural causes.61
Under the CWA, states are required to establish water quality
standards for their waters first by designating the uses made of the
water and then by establishing water quality criteria necessary to
protect those uses.62 States must then make a list of waters that do
not meet their water quality standards, commonly known as the
“impaired waters list.”63 For each segment of a water body that is
impaired, the state must then establish total maximum daily loads
(“TMDLs”) for pollutants, that is, the maximum amount of a particular
pollutant that can pass through the water segment without violating the
quality standard set for that water body.64 Finally, the state must
rank its impaired waters for which it has not established TMDLs,
showing the order in which it proposes to establish TMDLs.65 States
must submit their impaired waters list, TMDLs, and priority rankings
to the EPA for approval every two years.66
The plaintiffs challenged the EPA’s approval of Florida’s 2002 updated
impaired waters list and related information. The EPA approved the list
Florida submitted in large part but also added eighty impaired waters
to the list that Florida had either omitted or removed from the original
1998 list.67 The plaintiffs claimed that Florida, and the EPA by its
approval, (1) improperly excluded waters from the list when the only
evidence showing a water to be impaired either was more than seven-
and-a-half years old or consisted solely of fish consumption advisories for
58. Id. at 917.
59. Id. at 916-17.
60. Id. at 920.
61. Id. at 921.
62. Id. at 907 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(c)).
63. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A)).
64. Id. at 908 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c)).
65. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A)).
66. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1) (2007)).
67. Id. at 908-09.
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mercury contamination, (2) did not take into account standards required
by the CWA in prioritizing its list for establishing TMDL, and (3)
improperly excluded waters from the list that had exceeded water
quality standards at least once in the preceding seven-and-a-half years
or had exceeded the standards due to natural causes.68 The district
court granted summary judgment to the EPA on all of the plaintiffs’
claims, and the plaintiffs appealed.69
First, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment
for the EPA on the issue of whether EPA had arbitrarily approved
Florida’s list of impaired waters, and in so holding, the court observed
that Florida and the EPA had failed to consider certain data in
developing and approving the impaired waters list.70 Florida developed
its 2002 list by examining only stream data collected within the
preceding seven-and-a-half years, and the EPA approved this methodolo-
gy.71 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the EPA’s regulations require
states to “ ‘assemble and evaluate all existing and readily available water
quality-related data and information to develop’” its impaired waters
list.72 The regulations also require the state to submit, and the EPA
to consider, “ ‘[a] rationale for any decision to not use any existing and
readily available data.’”73 Florida justified its seven-and-a-half year
cutoff based on its desire to make listing decisions based on current
conditions, which the EPA found to be reasonable.74 However, the
Eleventh Circuit held that while the state could elect not to use certain
data after an initial evaluation, it could not elect to merely not consider
the data in the first place; thus, the EPA’s approval of Florida’s decision
to only consider data within the preceding seven-and-a-half years
contradicted the EPA’s own regulations, and the EPA’s decision was not
entitled to deference from the court.75 For similar reasons, the court
held that Florida improperly failed to consider water body-specific fish
consumption advisories due to mercury contamination in making its
listing decisions, and thus the EPA’s approval of the list may have been
arbitrary on this ground as well.76 However, the court held that
68. Id. at 909.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 913.
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(5) (2007)).
73. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(6)(iii) (2007)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 913.
76. Id. at 914-17. The EPA contended that neither of these alleged deficiencies resulted
in waters being left off the list that otherwise would have been included. The plaintiffs
disputed this assertion. Id. at 914. The court remanded the case for this determination;
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Florida was not required to consider statewide fish consumption
advisories in making its list because an EPA guidance letter stated that
only water body-specific data constituted “existing and readily available
data” within the meaning of its regulations.77 While the court noted
that it did not accord the guidance letter traditional deference, it found
the rationale in the letter reasonable.78 Finally, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that although the EPA found that Florida improper-
ly omitted eleven waters from the list, the EPA could not simply
unilaterally add those waters to the list because it was required to
discard Florida’s list in its entirety and develop a new one independent-
ly.79 The court explained that the relevant provision of the CWA80 did
not mandate such a remedy.81
Second, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the
EPA on Florida’s priority ranking of its impaired waters because Florida
had automatically given a low priority for the development of TMDLs to
waters listed due to fish consumption advisories for mercury.82 The
plaintiffs contended that because the CWA directed states to establish
its priority ranking based on the “ ‘severity of the pollution and the uses
to be made of such waters,’ ” the automatic ranking of Florida’s impaired
waters list was arbitrary.83 The district court had concluded that the
EPA was entitled to summary judgment because, unlike the list itself,
the EPA had no duty to approve or disapprove the priority rankings a
state gives its waters.84 The Eleventh Circuit agreed regarding the
actual rankings, but it held that the EPA still had a duty to ensure that
the state developed its rankings by taking into account the statutory
factors of the severity of the pollution and the uses to be made of the
the court explained: “Unless the dispute is resolved or found not material, it may preclude
the entry of summary judgment [to the EPA] on [the plaintiffs’] first claim.” Id.
77. Id. at 914.
78. Id. at 915. The court stated that while an agency guidance letter is not entitled to
the level of deference that courts afford to an agency’s formal rulemaking or adjudication
of its regulations under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984), the guidance letter was entitled to some deference from the court “ ‘proportional
to its “power to persuade.” ’ ” Sierra Club II, 488 F.3d at 915 (quoting United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001)).
79. Sierra Club II, 488 F.3d at 917.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). The section provides that when the EPA disapproves of a
state’s list of impaired waters, it must “identify such waters in such State and establish
such loads [that is, TMDLs] for such waters as [it] determines necessary to implement the
water quality standards applicable to such waters.” Id.
81. Sierra Club II, 488 F.3d at 916-17.
82. Id. at 918.
83. Id. at 917 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2000)).
84. Id.
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water.85 While the EPA, in its review of Florida’s list, found that
Florida had done so, the court held that a factual dispute existed on the
question, and it remanded for a determination of whether Florida had
in fact applied the statutory factors to each water in developing its
priority rankings.86
Third, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the EPA
on its approval of Florida’s removal of certain waters from the previous
list, waters that the plaintiffs contended either had exceeded applicable
water quality standards at least once in the previous seven-and-a-half
years or had exceeded standards due to natural conditions.87 As to the
first issue, in reviewing Florida’s list, instead of considering an
individual exceedance as absolute evidence that the water was impaired,
the EPA applied what the court termed a “totality” approach.88 The
court explained: “These factors [used by the EPA to review the list]
included whether more recent data show attainment that renders earlier
data suspect (trends); the magnitude of exceedance; the frequency of
exceedance; pollutant levels during critical conditions; and any other
site-specific data.”89 The court held that this approach was reasonable
and not in conflict with the CWA.90
Finally, as to the last issue (waters impaired due to natural condi-
tions), the court held that while the CWA “does not specifically address
whether waterbodies not meeting water quality criteria because of
naturally occurring conditions must be included on a state’s impaired
waters list, the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA as not requiring such
listings . . . is supported by a careful reading of the CWA and its
regulations.”91 The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to
the EPA on this issue.92
II. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne,93 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
85. Id. at 918.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 921.
88. Id. at 920.
89. Id. at 919-20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 920.
91. Id. The court explained that the “CWA’s express purpose is ‘to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’ ” Id. at
920-21 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)). Thus, the court concluded that Congress
intended that waters should be returned to their natural state, not modified from it. Id.
92. Id. at 921.
93. 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007).
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(“FWS”) did not act arbitrarily when it relied on taxonomic rather than
genetic evidence to determine that the rare Alabama sturgeon was a
separate species from the more abundant shovelnose sturgeon94 for the
purposes of listing the Alabama sturgeon as an endangered species.95
The court also held that the FWS’s failure to designate critical habitat
for the Alabama sturgeon within two years of its listing, as required by
the Endangered Species Act (the “Act”),96 did not require that the
species be delisted.97 Finally, the court held that the FWS’s listing of
the Alabama sturgeon, a species with no commercial value found only in
south Alabama, did not violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.98
The Alabama sturgeon was at one point a plentiful species that was
fished commercially, but overfishing, dam construction, dredging and
channeling of its habitat, and declining water quality reduced its
numbers to the point that the FWS had to withdraw its first attempt to
list the sturgeon, in 1993, because it could not confirm that the fish still
existed at all. After eight confirmed catches of the fish in the 1990s, the
FWS again proposed listing the sturgeon as endangered in 1999 and
issued the final rule listing the fish in 2000.99
The Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition (the “Coalition”), a group of
industries and associations opposed to the listing, sued, claiming defects
in the listing process. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama granted the FWS’s motion for summary judgment,
but it also ordered the FWS to designate critical habitat for the sturgeon
by November 2006. The Coalition appealed the grant of summary
judgment to the FWS.100
The Coalition first claimed that in listing the Alabama sturgeon as
endangered, the FWS failed to consider the “best scientific data
available” as required by the Act.101 The Coalition claimed that the
FWS discounted genetic evidence that the Alabama sturgeon and the
94. Or, as Judge Carnes succinctly described the issue: “Two fish, or not two fish?
That is the question.” Id. at 1252.
95. Id. at 1259-60.
96. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
97. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1271.
98. Id. at 1276; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
99. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1253.
100. Id. at 1254. The Endangered Species Act requires the FWS to designate critical
habitat for an endangered species within, at most, two years from the date the species is
listed. 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(6)(c)(ii) (2000). In this case, FWS failed to designate critical
habitat, and still had not done so at the time of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. Alabama-
Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1263.
101. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1254.
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nonendangered shovelnose sturgeon were in fact the same species and
instead relied on the “older, subjective method of morphological
taxonomy” to reach its separate-species determination.102 The FWS
countered that genetic testing evidence is but one factor in a taxonomic
determination. In this case, the FWS claimed that it did consider
genetics, which by itself was inconclusive, but it also balanced other
relevant factors in the taxonomic analysis, including morphological,
chromosomal, biochemical, physiological, behavioral, ecological, and
biogeographic characteristics, which the FWS argued supported
classifying the Alabama sturgeon as a separate species.103 The court
sided with the FWS, noting that the FWS had considered genetic testing
along with much other evidence, including all “existing literature and
the additional expert opinions” on the species question, almost all of
which supported treating the Alabama sturgeon as a separate spe-
cies.104 The court noted that under its standard of review applicable
to an agency decision, it could only find a rule arbitrary and capricious
when
“the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”105
Because FWS had considered the best scientific data available and had
considered all aspects of the problem, including genetic evidence, and
because most of that evidence in fact supported FWS’s decision, the court
concluded that the listing decision was rational.106
The Coalition also contended that the final rule listing the sturgeon
as endangered should be vacated because FWS had failed to designate
critical habitat for the sturgeon, as required by the Act, within the time
frame allowed by the Act.107 Specifically, the Coalition claimed that
102. Id. at 1254-55 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 1255.
104. Id. at 1259.
105. Id. at 1254 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
106. Id. at 1260.
107. Id. at 1262. The Endangered Species Act requires the FWS to publish proposed
rules to list a species and to designate its critical habitat “not less than 90 days” before
publication of the final rules, respectively. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)(A) (2000). The FWS is
required to publish its final listing decision not later than one year from the date of
publication of the proposed rule, id. § 1533(b)(6)(A), and a final habitat designation
concurrently with the listing decision, unless the FWS determines that the critical habitat
is not determinable at the time of the listing decision, in which case the FWS can extend
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the FWS’s failure to propose a critical habitat designation during the
public comment period for FWS’s proposed decision may have caused
some potentially interested parties not to comment on the listing
decision who otherwise might have, thus “undermin[ing] the accuracy of
the listing decision.”108 The court rejected this argument based on a
thorough analysis of both the Act’s language itself and its legislative
history.109 First, the court noted that the Act did not require the FWS
to publish its proposals to list a species and designate its critical habitat
concurrently; rather, the Act requires concurrence only between critical
habitat designations and final listing decisions (critical habitat
designations are even subject to extensions).110 As such, the court
explained that there is no necessary connection between the comment
period for the listing decision and the comment period for the habitat
designation.111 Consequently, the court concluded that the absence of
comments on the habitat designation does not affect the integrity of the
listing decision.112 The court thus affirmed the district court’s ruling
that the FWS was not required to vacate and re-propose its final rule
listing the sturgeon as endangered.113
The court was critical of the FWS’s failure to designate critical habitat
for the sturgeon, noting that the failure to designate habitat is a chronic
problem with the agency’s administration of the Act.114 The court
the time to publish the final habitat designation by one additional year beyond the initial
one-year period between the proposed and final designations. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C). The
court reads these crisscrossing timelines to allow the FWS up to two years beyond the date
of its final listing rule to designate critical habitat for the species. Alabama-Tombigbee
Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1267. The Author reads the provisions to allow the FWS at most
twenty-one months beyond the final listing decision. The difference is moot in this case,
though, because the FWS has never designated critical habitat for the sturgeon. See id.
at 1263.
108. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1263. The Eleventh Circuit has
previously recognized that a party has standing to challenge an agency decision due to a
procedural defect in the notice and comment period for the decision—even if the challenger
itself participated in the comment process—if the challenger can show (1) a concrete injury
in fact due to the defect, (2) that such an injury in fact could have resulted from a lack of
participation—caused by the procedural defect—by others in the comment process, and (3)
that the additional participation would have improved the process and may have affected
the outcome. See Sierra Club v. Johnson, 436 F.3d 1269, 1275-79 (11th Cir. 2006).
109. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1264-67.
110. Id. at 1266-67.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 1271.
114. Id. at 1268. In 2006, in another case involving the FWS’s failure to designate
critical habitat for a listed species, the Eleventh Circuit held that the agency’s failure
constituted a one-time violation rather than an ongoing one for the purpose of determining
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stated that “[i]t may be that in an appropriate case a court should . . .
fashion some creative remedy to spur the Fish and Wildlife Service on
with habitat designation,” but then noted that as a remedy, “delisting
[as the Coalition proposed] is not creative, it is destructive. A species in
free fall needs all the protection it can get. We would not cut the cords
of a skydiver’s main parachute to punish the jump master for failing to
pack the fellow a reserve chute.”115
Finally, the Coalition contended that the FWS’s extension of Endan-
gered Species Act protection to the Alabama sturgeon—a species
admittedly with no commercial value and found only in one river basin
located entirely within Alabama—violated the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, which generally limits the federal govern-
ment’s regulatory activities to matters involving interstate com-
merce.116 The court rejected this argument as well.117 The court
noted that under settled United States Supreme Court interpretations
of the Commerce Clause, Congress could permissibly regulate “ ‘purely
local activities’” that are part of an economic class of activities that have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.118 The court further held
that the Endangered Species Act is a “general regulatory statute bearing
a substantial relation to commerce,”119 and therefore, the fact that its
regulatory scheme also could reach entirely local species, as it did in this
case, is not fatal to any individual decision to list such a species.120
III. CLEAN AIR ACT
In National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Tennessee Valley Authori-
ty,121 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of the plaintiffs’ claims that the defendant, the Tennessee
Valley Authority (“TVA”), violated the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)122 when
it overhauled one of its coal-fired boilers in Colbert County, Alabama in
1982 and 1983.123 The court affirmed that two of the plaintiffs’ claims
were barred by the five-year statute of limitations applicable to citizen
the limitations period for filing suit to challenge the failure. Ctr. for Biological Diversity
v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006).
115. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal., 477 F.3d at 1270-71.
116. Id. at 1271.
117. Id. at 1273.
118. Id. at 1272 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)).
119. Id. at 1273.
120. Id. at 1277.
121. 502 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
123. 502 F.3d at 1318 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)).
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suits under the CAA and that the third was barred by the plaintiffs’
failure to provide sufficient notice of their intent to sue.124
The TVA’s boiler at issue in the case had been in operation since 1965.
In 1982 and 1983 the TVA overhauled the boiler to restore capacity and
efficiency. The TVA did not treat the overhaul as a major modification
of an existing source under the CAA and thus neither obtained a
preconstruction permit for the modification nor modified the boiler in
compliance with New Source Performance Standards. It did, however,
operate the boiler at all times under an operating permit issued by the
state of Alabama under the CAA State Implementation Plan. In the
first two counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint, they alleged that the TVA
modified the boiler in violation of the “New Source Review” programs; in
the third count, the plaintiffs alleged that the boiler’s emissions after
modification exceeded limitations applicable to a new source. The
plaintiffs sought both civil penalties and injunctive relief.125
The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims based on the
TVA’s alleged failure to modify the boiler in compliance with the New
Source Review program were barred by the five-year statute of
limitations.126 The court first held that even assuming the boiler
modification constituted a “major modification” subject to the New
Source program,127 the TVA’s failure to comply with the program
constituted a one-time violation of the CAA and not a continuing
violation, as the plaintiffs contended.128 The court noted that most
courts considering the question treated an operator’s failure to modify
an existing source in compliance with the New Source program as a one-
time and not a continuing violation.129 Although the court recognized
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1318-20. The substantive issue before the district court was whether the
TVA’s overhaul of its boiler constituted a “major modification” of an existing source that
would subject TVA to the requirements of the New Source Review program, including,
among other things, preconstruction permitting and the installation of the best available
technology to reduce emissions, as well as more stringent emissions regulations thereafter.
See id. at 1319 n.1. Neither the district court nor the Eleventh Circuit reached this issue,
however. The EPA had brought the same claim against several TVA facilities, including
the boiler at issue in this case, in an administrative enforcement action in 1999. Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit
subsequently held that proceeding unconstitutional. Id. at 1260. The plaintiffs then
brought the present action under the citizen suit provision of the CAA. Nat’l Parks &
Conservation Ass’n, Inc., 502 F.3d at 1318-20.
126. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, Inc., 502 F.3d at 1318.
127. Id. at 1320.
128. Id. at 1322 (quoting New York v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d
650, 661 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)).
129. Id.
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that some courts had found such a violation to be continuing, the court
distinguished these cases on the ground that those jurisdictions issued
construction and operating permits that were somehow integrated or
connected, making compliant construction a condition of lawful operation
of the source.130 The court explained that in this situation, the failure
to follow applicable preconstruction and construction regulations would
be a continuing violation of the source’s operating permit.131 However,
under Alabama’s State Implementation Plan in effect at the time of
TVA’s modification of the boiler, the construction and operating permits
were separate, and thus a failure to modify the boiler in compliance with
applicable regulations would not be a violation of the boiler’s operating
permit.132 As such, the court held that because any violation that
occurred during construction occurred well more than five years before
the suit was filed, claims arising out of those alleged violations were
barred.133
The court also affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs’ third count—that
TVA’s operation of the boiler after it was modified had violated the New
Source Performance Standards continuously for twenty years.134 The
citizen suit provision of the CAA requires that a plaintiff send a notice
of intent to sue to the defendant prior to filing suit.135 The notice must
contain, among other things, specific information identifying the
standard, limitation, or order allegedly violated and the date or dates of
the alleged violation.136 In their pre-suit notice letter to TVA, the
plaintiffs alleged generally that TVA’s boiler had violated the New
Source Performance Standards with regard to several pollutants
(including nitrogen oxide, particulates, and sulfur dioxide) every day
130. Id. at 1323.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1323-25.
133. Id. at 1326. The court pointed out that the applicable five-year statute of
limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2000), by its terms applies only to legal claims, not equitable
claims. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, Inc., 502 F.3d at 1326. However, the court in
a separate analysis held that the plaintiffs’ equitable claims were barred by the “concurrent
remedy doctrine,” which bars equitable claims based on the same facts as legal claims
when the legal claims are time-barred. Id. (citing Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464
(1947)). The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that because they were acting as
“private attorneys general” in bringing the citizen suit, an exception to the doctrine for
claims brought by the federal government should apply to them. Id. at 1327. In rejecting
this argument, the court explained that under the CAA, plaintiffs in citizen suit cases are
acting on their own behalf and “do not represent the public at large in the same way the
government does when it brings suit to enforce the statute.” Id.
134. Id. at 1330.
135. Id. at 1328 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A)).
136. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 54.3(b) (2004)).
1178 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
since the modification. The plaintiffs’ subsequent complaint alleged
violation of the standards only with respect to sulfur dioxide.137 As a
result, the court held that the notice letter was insufficiently specific
regarding the alleged violations.138 Also, the court held that the letter
did not identify the dates of the alleged violations with sufficient
specificity to allow TVA to “identify[] the violations of which it was
accused.”139 Based on these holdings, the court affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety.140
In Sierra Club v. Administrator, U.S. E.P.A.,141 the Eleventh Circuit
answered a question that it left unanswered in a previous appearance
of the case:142 whether the EPA’s interpretation of a state regula-
tion,143 part of Georgia’s State Implementation Plan under the CAA,
should be accorded Chevron deference144 and, if so, whether the
agency’s interpretation of the regulation was reasonable?145 The court
answered both questions in the affirmative and therefore affirmed the
EPA’s order challenged by the plaintiffs.146
Under the Georgia regulation at issue in the case, the state would not
issue a permit to construct or modify a major source of air pollutants
unless the owner or operator of the source could demonstrate that all
other sources owned or operated by that owner were in compliance with
all applicable CAA emission limitations and standards.147 In 2000
Oglethorpe Power Company applied for preconstruction and operating
permits for a power generating unit it owned at Plant Wansley.
Oglethorpe also owned a sixty percent interest in two power generating
units at Plant Scherer. Both of those units were in compliance with all
applicable CAA standards. Georgia Power Company owned two other
units at Plant Scherer that were not in compliance. Georgia Power also
operated Plant Scherer, and the four units shared one CAA operating
137. Id. at 1330.
138. Id. at 1329.
139. Id. at 1330.
140. Id.
141. 496 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 2007).
142. Sierra Club v. Leavitt (Sierra Club I), 368 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004) (labeled
“Sierra Club I” by the court in the 2007 case).
143. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-1-.03(8)(c) (2007).
144. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron case requires
courts, among other things, to give deference to an administrative agency’s reasonable
interpretations of ambiguous statutory or regulatory provisions that it administers. See
Sierra Club v. Adm’r, U.S. E.P.A., 496 F.3d at 1186.
145. Sierra Club v. Adm’r, U.S. E.P.A., 496 F.3d at 1184.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1186; GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-1-.03(8)(c) (2007).
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permit.148 Oglethorpe did not own any controlling interest in Georgia
Power and could not force Georgia Power to bring the noncompliant
units at Scherer into compliance.149 As the court explained,
the issue confronted by the Georgia EPD, and subsequently by the EPA
[in approving Georgia’s permitting decision in favor of Oglethorpe], was
whether to deem Oglethorpe an owner of a noncompliant major
stationary source when it had part ownership of two CAA-compliant
units in a major stationary source [that also contained two noncom-
pliant units].150
Georgia decided not to treat Oglethorpe as the owner of a noncompliant
source at Plant Scherer and issued Oglethorpe permits for its unit at
Plant Wansley. The EPA approved Georgia’s decision and the plaintiff
challenged the EPA’s approval.151
The court first held that the EPA’s interpretation of Georgia’s
regulation was entitled to the deference from the court required by the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron.152 The court
concluded that the regulation was ambiguous regarding the question
involved in the case.153 The court also concluded that because Geor-
gia’s administration of the regulation, which was part of Georgia’s CAA
Implementation Plan, was subject to EPA oversight, the regulation was
also subject to EPA enforcement for deference analysis purposes.154
For these reasons, the court held that the district court’s deference to the
EPA’s interpretation of the regulation was proper.155
The court then held that the EPA’s order approving the permit
issuance to Oglethorpe was based on a reasonable interpretation of the
regulation.156 In the case’s previous appearance at the Eleventh
Circuit, Sierra Club I, the plaintiff had successfully challenged the EPA’s
approval of the Oglethorpe permits on the ground that the EPA had
given the term “major stationary source” in the regulation different
meanings “in the permitting and compliance contexts.”157 The Elev-
enth Circuit, without reaching the deference issue, determined that the
EPA’s interpretation in that instance was arbitrary because the agency
148. Sierra Club v. Adm’r, U.S. E.P.A., 496 F.3d at 1184-85.
149. Id. at 1188.
150. Id. at 1185.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1186.
153. Id. at 1187.
154. Id. at 1186.
155. Id. at 1188.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1187 (citing Sierra Club I, 368 F.3d at 1302 n.1).
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provided no explanation for the different interpretations.158 In the
present case, the EPA did provide an explanation for its interpretation
of the terms that the court held was reasonable.159 The court ex-
plained, “[I]t does not appear to us to be unreasonable for the EPA to
have looked only to the owner or operator of a specific noncompliant unit
in a major stationary source when deciding whether a company should
receive a permit under the Georgia Statewide Compliance Rule,” and the
court consequently accepted the agency’s explanation that the rule’s
purpose would not be served if the applicant were penalized for
violations at sources where it does not have the power to correct the
violations.160
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1188.
160. Id.
